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We reexamine some of the classic problems connected with the use of cardinal util-
ity functions in decision theory, and discuss Patrick Suppes’ contributions to this
ﬁeld in light of a reinterpretation we propose for these problems. We analytically
decompose the doctrine of ordinalism, which only accepts ordinal utility functions,
and distinguish between several doctrines of cardinalism, depending on what com-
ponents of ordinalism they speciﬁcally reject. We identify Suppes’ doctrine with the
major deviation from ordinalism that conceives of utility functions as representing
preference differences, while being nonetheless empirically related to choices. We
highlight the originality, promises and limits of this choice-based cardinalism.
Keywords: ordinal utility; cardinal utility; preference differences; representation
theorems; Suppes; ordinalism; cardinalism
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the connection of choice data with cardinal utility functions. By
the standards of today’s microeconomics, the latter cannot rightfully represent the for-
mer. From the ordinal revolution of the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century onwards, and
despite the turn taken later by von Neumann and Morgenstern, neoclassical economists
have been reluctant to allow into cardinal utility in economic theory. This reluctance is
inseparable from the view, which spread out among them concurrently, that choices are
the overarching kind of data to be considered. As microeconomics textbooks put it,
‘cardinal utility [functions are not] needed to describe choice behavior’ (Varian, 2005,
p. 58), and if they nonetheless sometimes occur, they are ‘simply convenient choices
for a utility representation’ (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995, p. 50). A pivotal
claim, which is generally left implicit, underlies these familiar statements: if choices
are taken to constitute the empirical basis of economics, then cardinal utility loses its
principled justiﬁcations. Had today’s neoclassical economists not adhered to this claim,
they would have felt free to rely mainly or exclusively on choice data, and nonetheless
leave more scope to cardinal utility than just what convenience reasons permit. How-
ever, by the current views, this sounds like an impossible theoretical combination.
A homage to Patrick Suppes provides a good occasion to examine the claim we
have singled out.1 In the post-war years, Suppes contributed to giving the nascent disci-
pline of decision theory its operating standards, a collective undertaking in which many
other prominent scholars were involved, were they among his close collaborators, like
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Luce, or more loosely connected with him, like Marschak, Savage and other followers
of von Neumann and Morgenstern. All these writers assigned to decision theory the
task of proving representation theorems, i.e. theorems clarifying the equivalences hold-
ing between relational statements, typically interpreted as preference statements, and
numerical statements, typically interpreted as utility statements, and all of them identi-
ﬁed this proving task with an application of the axiomatic method as could be encoun-
tered elsewhere in logic, mathematics and science.2 In this brilliant group of
contributors, Suppes can be noted for two signiﬁcant features. For one thing, he was
generally concerned with the problem of measuring quantities, and as such conceived
of the axiomatic exercise as a way to establish speciﬁc forms of measurement. In his
quest for the most precise forms, he was led to emphasize cardinal representations as a
suitable objective for his theorems. For another thing, being an empiricist philosopher
and scientist, he took choices to be the privileged, if not unique, source of data the
axiomatic exercise should pay attention to. In effect, without saying so much, Suppes
was running against the ordinalist tide of neoclassical economics. We offer this not as
a historical statement, but as a reinterpretation of his work, since he was neither ini-
tially trained nor primarily interested in economics as such (see his enlightening 1979
‘Self-Proﬁle’, from which economics is almost absent).
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, we give more ﬂesh to the ordinalist tenets sketched at
the beginning of this introduction; once again, we propose a conceptual reconstruction,
and leave for others the full history of the matter. What we mean is to set a clear nega-
tive benchmark against which fruitful connections between choice and cardinal utility
can be discussed. In the second part, we single out some of Suppes’ contributions to
the theory of cardinal representations, pertaining, respectively, to (i) choice under uncer-
tainty, (ii) stochastic choice and (iii) choice under certainty. The third part elaborates on
the conﬂict between these contributions and the ordinalist tenets of the ﬁrst part. We
highlight Suppes’ suggestions on (iii), which in our view contains valuable advances.
Extracting a general take-away message from his work, we end up cautiously defending
the possibility of choice-based cardinal utility representations.
2. Ordinalism and its dissenters
Any discussion of the ordinalist tenets should begin with the celebrated discovery made
by neoclassical writers at the dawn of the twentieth century. To recover the essentials of
demand theory, it proved unnecessary to endow the individual consumer with a ‘numeri-
cal’ or ‘measurable’ utility function over the set of commodity baskets. A utility func-
tion that merely indicates the consumer’s preference ordering over these baskets proves
sufﬁcient to deliver what can be salvaged from the old law of demand and related
propositions. Before this major discovery, neoclassicals had developed demand theory
from the law of decreasing marginal utilities or other assumptions that can be stated only
if the utility function makes deﬁnite numerical sense. The standard account singles out
Pareto (1909) for replacing this thick apparatus by a thinner one, and his followers like
Slutsky (1915), Hicks and Allen (1934) and Hicks (1939) for bringing this replacement
programme to completion. In this revised form of neoclassicism, utility functions would
have to be ordinal, in the sense of being unique up to any increasing transformation.
Henceforth, when we write that a utility function is ‘ordinal’, we refer to this deﬁnition.
It appears to have stabilized before than the deﬁnition of a cardinal utility function did.
Even relatively late in the twentieth century, neoclassical writers often adopted different
words and different ideas to capture the more-than-ordinal features of a utility function.
2 J. Baccelli and P. Mongin
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They said not only ‘cardinal’, but also ‘numerical’, ‘measurable’ and ‘quantitative’,
being quite vague – and no doubt disagreeing between themselves – on the kind of
mathematical uniqueness they had in view for the utility function.3
As Hicks (1939, p. 18) writes,
we have now to inquire whether a full theory of consumer’s demand (…) cannot be built
up from the assumption of a scale of preference. In constructing such a theory it will be
necessary every time to reject any concept which is at all dependent on quantitative utility,
so that it cannot be derived from the indifference map alone.
Beside testifying to the vagueness of ideas concerning ‘quantitative utility’, this com-
ment is instructive in the following way: while Hicks means his explication to restrict
the utility concept, it also turns out to restrict the preference concept. Preference is
taken here to be a mere disposition to rank the objects of interest (or to classify them
as being indifferent, which we include in our notion of a ranking). As Hicks goes on,
‘we start off from the indifference map alone; nothing more can be allowed’. Among
other things, this implies that unlike in some earlier approaches, there will be no room
in the new theory for comparisons of the type ‘i prefers more intensely hot chocolate
to coffee, than he prefers tea to herbal tea’. Such comparisons are undeﬁned because
they do something else than ranking options. Samuelson’s Foundations (1947) exempli-
ﬁes the glide, which we emphasize here, from the claim that utility is exclusively ordi-
nal to the claim that preference also is.4 The Paretians never made this claim explicitly,
so it remains unclear whether they would have defended it as a semantic truth about
the word ‘preference’, or as a technical restriction, which would be imposed for
theoretical or other strategic purposes.
In whichever interpretation one takes, this slimmering of the preference concept
was linked to a novel emphasis on choices as the appropriate basis for demand theory.
In the Manual, Pareto himself had promoted his ordinal utility analysis by arguing not
only that it was logically sufﬁcient for demand theory, but also that it made this theory
more empirical, hence – in his positivistic conception – more scientiﬁc. Allegedly, this
upgrading of the theory followed because the consumers’ choices were the new primi-
tives (see, e.g. 1909, III, 36bis). To reconcile Pareto’s claim on choices with the one
made later by Hicks, to the effect that preferences are the primitives, one must assume
that the psychological data of preferences can be expressed sufﬁciently well by the
external facts of choice. One way or another, this further reductive assumption underlay
all the Paretians’ work even before Samuelson, starting with his 1938 paper, gave it the
famous twist of ‘revealed preference’. Without elaborating here on individual positions,
we wish to emphasize that all Paretians supposed a close afﬁnity between preferences
and choices, and this could only reinforce their slim conception of preferences. Indeed,
to choose among options is to select some and leave others aside; from barely observ-
ing this activity, it seems easy to infer a preference understood as a ranking of options,
and impossible to infer anything like a preference intensity.
Our detour by demand theory can be excused by the historical fact that it deﬁned a
benchmark for the analysis of economic decision-making in general. This benchmark is
what we are interested in here. We call it ordinalism and summarize it by three reduc-
tive tenets: (1) utility functions are merely a formal representation of preferences, (2)
preferences are merely a disposition to order the possible options, (3) choices merely
inform the observer on how preferences order options. We take (2) as denying that a
subject compares preference differences in the same structured way as he does prefer-
ence levels – in other words, as denying that the relation ‘I prefer more w to x than I
Journal of Economic Methodology 3
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do y to z’ deﬁnes an ordering. If (2) holds, (3) automatically does, but if (2) does not
hold, (3) may or may not hold. That is, if preferences have more than the ordering-of-
options property, it may or may not be the case that choices inform the observer on this
extra content. The possibility of either accepting or rejecting (3) when one rejects (2) is
essential to our reconstruction.
It follows from (1) and (2) together that utility functions can only be ordinal. A
more traditional account of ordinalist ideas would have extracted this last claim and
commented on it as follows: utility functions can only be ordinal because they merely
represent preferences. We object to this account on the ground that it takes for granted
the ordinalist conception of preferences as being mere rankings, and thus gives the false
impression that the ordinal property of utility functions directly follows from their rep-
resentational property. This virtually reduces ordinalism to claim (1) as if there were
nothing more to ordinalism. By making the conception of preferences the object of a
separate commitment, we make it clear that two separate claims underlie the uniqueness
property of utility functions. Thus, our framework allows for the logical possibility that
a utility function be merely representational and nonetheless represent preference
differences, satisfying (1) but violating (2), and this will indeed be the conception we
attribute to Suppes. A different objection to the more standard accounts, we think that
ordinalism should be discussed not only in terms of the preference but also in terms of
the choice concept, although one must be careful here not to confuse ordinalism
with the revealed preference methodology (the latter being only a particular develop-
ment of the former).
The present account can be compared with Mongin and d’Aspremont’s briefer com-
ments (Mongin & d’Aspremont, 1998, pp. 385–386), which emphasize (2) as a separate
claim, and the addition made by Bruni and Guala (2001, p. 24). The last authors rightly
emphasize that ordinalists limited the role of psychological assumptions in economics.
This feature actually derives from the present list as follows: claim (1) excludes that
utility has a psychological basis in the psychological feeling of subjective satisfaction
(as in most classical and early neoclassical views), claim (2) excludes part of the psy-
chological content one may associate with the concept of preference and claim (3) min-
imizes the psychological content of choice information.5
To further illustrate the logical content of the three tenets, and also to prepare the
upcoming comparison with Suppes, we consider a historical departure from (2) that
predated his work and to some extent inﬂuenced it. In an allusive passage of the
Manual (1909, IV, §32), Pareto had claimed that, when faced with four commodity bas-
kets w, x, y, z, the consumer can know whether he is more satisﬁed passing from x to
w, or passing from z to y. This is a striking early occurrence of the claim that compar-
isons can be made not only between levels of satisfaction but also between differences
in these levels. However, as could be expected from the founder of ordinalism, Pareto
had considered such comparisons only to exclude them; for him, they lacked sufﬁcient
‘precision’ to be subjected to a scientiﬁc inquiry. But Lange (1934) spotted the curious
passage and tried to develop it in a positive direction. He claimed that a subject com-
paring Paretian ‘transitions’ could be endowed with a ‘cardinal’ utility function.
Lange’s sketch of proof was unsound, as others – prominently the mathematician Alt
(1936–1971) – were soon to demonstrate. But he had launched a line of research that
implicitly rejected the ordinalist claim (2). Lange’s analysis unfolded at the level of
utility representations alone, and thus remained equivocal, but Alt made a step towards
the rejection of (2) by introducing a quaternary ordering on the options, i.e. an
ordering that compares pairs of options (w, x) and (y, z). Putting axioms on this new
4 J. Baccelli and P. Mongin
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primitive term, he obtained a utility function on the options with a relevant uniqueness
property, thus proving one of the ﬁrst representation theorems ever, and more speciﬁ-
cally opening the way to Suppes’ work along the same line. To the extent that Alt’s
ordering can be interpreted as a preference ordering, he can be said to have opposed
(2) and thus shaken ordinalism at the peak of its theoretical success.
Without mentioning Pareto’s passage, and probably without being aware of it,
Frisch (1926, 1932) had already formalized comparisons of ‘displacements’ in the com-
modity space by a quaternary relation. However, this is a formalization without a
proper axiomatization, and in point of fact, only a brief detour in two pieces that are
primarily concerned with the empirical measurement of marginal utility. We mention
Frisch nonetheless because Suppes refers to Frisch, though not to Alt, whose more sig-
niﬁcant contribution became recognized only belatedly.6
The programme initiated by Lange leaves two ordinalist tenets in place. Consis-
tently with (1), it takes utility to have no meaning per se, but only to serve as a repre-
sentation device, and consistently with (3), it limits choices to providing basic ranking
information. This last point calls for more detail. Lange and followers tended to take
introspection to be the single source of the quaternary comparisons, and we interpret
this restrictive position as being dictated by continuing adherence to (3). A comment
that Allen published on Lange’s work makes this connection of ideas entirely explicit:
It has been suggested that a second basic assumption can be added to the one already
made [on the existence of a preference ranking of alternatives]. This assumption refers to
changes in the ‘intensity’ of the preferences expressed by the individual. It implies, in
short, that the individual can distinguish increments of preference and that he can order
these increments in the same way as the preferences themselves. Here we are dealing with
something quite new. The assumption cannot be expressed in terms of the individual’s acts
of choice; it can only be supported by introspection into one’s own experience or by ques-
tioning others about their experiences. (Allen, 1935, p. 155, our emphasis)
Notice that Allen’s lines also testify to the fact that Lange’s readers thought of
quaternary comparisons as being preference comparisons. Once a classic, Allen’s
(1956, pp. 669–676) text on mathematical economics discusses ‘ordinal’ versus
‘measurable’ utility along the same lines as his briefer comment on Lange.
A different argument on ordinalism became available when von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947, Appendix), and more clearly their followers, connected the time-
honoured expected utility (EU) formula with a preference ordering over lotteries. This
collective work, which Suppes witnessed when it was still in progress, converged to
the classic theorem stating that, given relevant axiomatic conditions, the ordering has a
representation in terms of this EU formula. The uniqueness clause of the theorem
seemed to endow the utility function in this formula with a numerical (‘measurable’)
property, and this raised puzzlement among post-war economists, who, by then, had
been heavily exposed to ordinalist ideas. An intricate and profuse discussion resulted
among them. Some claimed that von Neumann and Morgenstern (VNM) had rehabili-
tated the ‘cardinal utility’ of the classical and early neoclassicals, others, that this was
not the case but they had nonetheless obtained a ‘cardinal utility’ function of their
own, and still others, that neither was the case and that their EU representation was in
fact ordinal. Although this would contextualize Suppes’ work more fully, it goes
beyond the scope of this paper to review the post-war debate on ‘the cardinal utility
which is ordinal’, to use Baumol’s (1958) striking words, and we refer the reader to the
existing historical work in Fishburn (1989) and Moscati (2013a, 2016a). But we will
brieﬂy indicate the two key technical factors of this debate, which, respectively,
Journal of Economic Methodology 5
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concern the uniqueness property of the VNM utility function and its ability to induce a
measurement of preference differences.
Let us then take a closer look at the VNM representation theorem. Its conclusion
actually decomposes into an existence and a uniqueness part. According to the former,
there exists a utility function u on the ﬁnal outcomes X such that the preference order-
ing of two lotteries P and Q coincides with the comparison made between the expected
utility values EPu and EQu of these two lotteries. Formally, if one denotes by R the
primitive weak preference ordering:
PRQ if and only if EPuEQu:
According to the latter, uniqueness part, the function u is unique up to a positive afﬁne
transformation (PAT)7 in this representation. Formally, if u0 is another utility function
on X, the following equivalence holds:
PRQ if and only if EPu
0 EQu0
if and only if u0 is a PAT of u.
A simple argument shows that the italicized clause in this representation cannot be
removed. Since the VNM axiomatization assumes no more than a preference ordering
on lotteries, it follows that the EPu representation is in fact ordinal, i.e. unique up to
any increasing transformation φ. For instance, (EPu)
2 or expðEPuÞ are as admissible
representations of the preferences over lotteries as is EPu. This observation readily
entails that there is no way of reinforcing the uniqueness conclusion for u. For suppose
that u were unique to PAT unrestrictedly; then the representation EPu would be unique
up to PAT, and not up to any increasing transformation as was just said.
This discussion suggests introducing two notions of a cardinal utility function for
the remainder of the paper. Let us say that a utility function on some set of options is
absolutely cardinal if it is unique up to PAT, and that it is relatively cardinal if it is
unique up to PAT for a given format of representation, such as the EU format here. We
will see that this contrast applies broadly. As far as VNM theory is concerned, a good
deal of the post-war debate can be explained by the fact that many protagonists missed
the contrast entirely. Those who claimed that VNM had rehabilitated the ‘cardinal util-
ity’ of the classical and early neoclassicals were off the mark, since they ignored the
new feature of VNM utility being obtained by a representation theorem, but even those
who claimed that VNM had obtained a ‘cardinal utility’ function of their own were not
always correct, since some wrongly believed that the u of the representation theorem
was absolutely cardinal. And those who claimed that this u was ordinal missed the
important point that a relatively cardinal utility obeys a stronger uniqueness restriction
than an arbitrary ordinal utility function.
The other key factor of the controversy has to do with the following argument,
which was often discussed in the controversy (see a classic occurrence in Luce &
Raiffa, 1957, pp. 31–34). Once the EU representation is obtained from the existence
conclusion of the VNM theorem, a utility difference formalism becomes readily
available. Take two equiprobable lotteries between w and x, and between y and z,
respectively, and suppose that the preference ordering puts the ﬁrst strictly above the
second. Then,
6 J. Baccelli and P. Mongin
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12
uðwÞ þ 1
2
uðzÞ[ 1
2
uðyÞ þ 1
2
uðxÞ;
which is trivially equivalent to:
uðwÞ  uðxÞ[ uðyÞ  uðzÞ:
Many participants to the debate took the comparisons of utility differences thus
obtained to represent corresponding preference differences; in the particular instance,
they would have concluded that the subject prefers w to x more than he prefers y to z.
This understanding of VNM utility differences points towards the alternative deﬁnition
of a cardinal utility function as being one that can represent not only preference levels,
but also preference differences, and this alternative deﬁnition was indeed present in
the debate, while being unclearly related to the formal deﬁnitions of the previous para-
graph. This compounded the confusion already created by the poor understanding of
the formal deﬁnitions. We refrain from saying more on VNM utility differences at the
present stage, since this issue will come out again when we discuss Suppes in
Section 4.
As a summary on the VNM theorem, we compare it with the three ordinalist tenets.
It gives a purely representational sense to the EU formula, thus supporting (1). Whether
it also supports (2) is a complex issue, depending on how one views the utility differ-
ence argument of last paragraph. If one rejects (2) on the ground that VNM utility can
measure preference differences, it seems obvious to reject (3), since choices among lot-
teries, in the plain sense of what counts as a choice, become a source of information
on preference differences. The position we will attribute to Suppes concerning EU rep-
resentations (more generally than the VNM representation) will consist of this twin
rejection of (2) and (3). We now move to a description (Section 3) and an assessment
(Section 4) of his contributions.
3 Suppes on utility differences
Suppes’ decision-theoretic contributions respond to a unifying concern for scientiﬁc
measurement. In a sequel of papers and books that culminated with the famous series
of The Foundations of Measurement (starting in 1971), coauthored with Krantz, Luce
and Tversky, he investigated various forms of measurement of empirical properties, and
ﬁtted them in a uniﬁed mathematical framework that permitted deﬁning and comparing
them rigorously. When he tackled decision-theoretic issues in separate pieces of
research, he always emphasized that they entered the measurement framework as partic-
ular cases, and thus illustrated its heuristic fecundity.
This approach has some noticeable consequences. First of all, unlike many posi-
tivist philosophers and scientists, Suppes does not draw a sharp line between physical
and psychological properties. What matters to him is whether or not they are empirical
properties, and in case they are, what kind of measurement they are amenable to. With
this open mind, when he discusses decision-theoretic issues, he does not discard intro-
spection as a possible source of information and contents himself with the claim that
choices are a better source. As one of his leading papers goes, ‘many areas of
economic and modern statistical theory do not warrant a behavioristic analysis of
utility. In these domains there seems little reason to be ashamed of direct appeals to
introspection’ (Suppes & Winet, 1955, p. 261). In the same vein, Luce and Suppes
Journal of Economic Methodology 7
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(1965, p. 273) write that introspection has been ‘unduly depreciated in some of the
modern literature on choice behavior’. Suppes’ position is not fully explicit, but it
seems to rely on the view that introspection provides empirical data no less than
choices, and if choice data are altogether preferable, this is only because they support
more secure forms of measurement.8
Second, Suppes practices the method of representation theorems to clarify measure-
ment possibilities. In decision theory, this leads him to be critical of the VNM and
Savage axiom systems, which he complains assume unrealistically large sets of options
and preferences comparisons. His favourite manner involves taking a ﬁnite set of
options and a subclass of the logically possible comparisons, even if this economy must
be achieved at the expense of the elegance and generality of the representation theo-
rems. When he cannot impose ﬁniteness, he tries at least to avoid topological or mea-
sure-theoretic assumptions on the set of options; typically, instead of such assumptions,
he introduces ‘solvability conditions’ among his axioms.
Third, the representation theorems that Suppes wishes for decision theory should
deliver a utility difference representation (this will automatically entail a utility-level
representation as a particular case). This search for a precise form of utility function
does not reﬂect a predetermined conception of preference and choice but rather a scien-
tiﬁc hope: to count as an empirical science, decision theory must be able at least some-
times to reach this stage of measurement, and carefully designing the observational or
experimental design could perhaps bring about this result. With these general comments
in place, we now sketch Suppes’ contributions, using his own terms as much as
possible. We will not emphasize the uniqueness problem of utility representations in
the present section. This, along with other substantial comments, will be reserved for
Section 4.
As Suppes and Winet (1955, p. 259) put at the outset, they are concerned with
‘reviving the notion of utility differences’ and believe they can do so by proving repre-
sentations theorems that apply to several choice contexts at once. The authors men-
tioned choice under uncertainty and choice under certainty, and with the beneﬁt of
hindsight, we can add stochastic choice, which attracted Suppes’ later interest. Still fol-
lowing Suppes and Winet, we distinguish two steps in this revival programme. Given a
domain X and a quaternary relation < deﬁned on X, the ﬁrst, mathematical step is to
subject the relational statements wx< yz to axiomatic conditions that will entail a repre-
sentation in terms of utility differences, namely,
ðÞ wx< yz if and only if uðwÞ  uðxÞ uðyÞ  uðzÞ;
for some u on X with a relevant uniqueness property. For this statement of the
mathematical problem, Suppes and Winet are indebted to the authors discussed in last
section – they cite both Frisch and Lange, although not Alt, who was not yet known.
The second, this time informal step, is to check that the domain X and the axiomatic
conditions on < are appropriate, given the interpretations for < provided by the above
contexts. At this semantic level, Suppes and Winet depart from Frisch, Lange and Alt,
since these predecessors had considered only one context, i.e. choice under certainty.
A preliminary comment is in order. The paper with Winet actually sets out to
axiomatize an absolute difference representation, i.e.
ðÞ wx< yz if and only if juðwÞ  uðxÞj  juðyÞ  uðzÞj:
8 J. Baccelli and P. Mongin
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It is however the algebraic difference representation (*) that Suppes’ revival pro-
gramme is concerned with. We ﬁnd it slightly embarrassing that the same paper con-
tains both the clearest statement of this programme and an unrepresentative
implementation of it. We will leave aside (**) until the end of Section 4, where we
argue in effect that Suppes should have axiomatized (*) rather then (**).
(i) Choice under uncertainty. This choice context is only brieﬂy mentioned in the
paper with Winet, but Suppes will return to it thoroughly later. If probabilities were
given, Suppes would simply repeat the argument discussed in last section, and take
wx< yz to hold if the subject weakly prefers an equiprobable lottery on w and z to
another equiprobable lottery on y and x. Assuming the VNM theorem to hold, this
would deliver the following equivalence:
wx< yz if and only if 1
2
uðwÞ þ 1
2
uðzÞ 1
2
uðyÞ þ 1
2
uðxÞ;
However, Suppes argues that the risk approach makes empirical sense only if ‘psycho-
logical probabilities are identical with the (…) objective’ ones, a very dubious assump-
tion in his view.9 In a deep and novel insight at this formative stage of decision theory,
Suppes realizes that subjective probabilities are more fundamental than lotteries and
VNM theory is in fact incomplete, since it takes probabilities as given only by mathe-
matical convention. In today’s textbook terminology, Suppes subordinates the theory of
risk to that of uncertainty. This is also Savage’s (1972/1954) insight and we will leave
it for historians to explain what the respective inﬂuences were.
Moving now to the more appropriate uncertainity context, we denote by wAz (resp.
yAx) the prospect of w (resp. y) obtaining if A occurs and z (resp. x) obtaining other-
wise. According to Suppes’ deﬁnition, wx< yz holds if the subject prefers wAz to
yAx, with the event A being such that for all x0; y0, x0Ay0 : y0Ax0. In the ﬁrst sketch
ever made of an axiomatization of subjective probabilities, Ramsey (1926, in 1931,
p. 177) had singled out events like A, calling them ‘ethically neutral’ (a strange
denomination); in words, A is such that a subject faced with two consequences x0 and
y0 is equally willing to see x0 realized on A and y0 on its complementary, or to see y0
realized on A and x0 on its complementary. When Ramsey’s axiomatic exercise is
properly completed, a subjective expected utility (SEU) representation emerges and the
ethically neutral event A receives probability 1/2, so that the prospects wAz and yAx
can occupy the role of the two equiprobable lotteries of VNM theory, and the equiva-
lence above holds, though with a more satisfactory interpretation of the equal probabil-
ity values. A utility difference representation as in (*) follows from the equivalence.
Two papers by Davidson and Suppes (1956) and Suppes (1956) implement the strategy
of this paragraph, while for the ﬁrst time bringing Ramsey’s ideas to the stage of sharp
representation theorems.10
We have stressed that Suppes’ axiomatic method embodies strong empirical
concerns, and this is reﬂected in Davidson and Suppes (1956) by two departures from
Ramsey’s implicitly unrestricted framework.11 The set X of consequences is taken to be
ﬁnite, and the axioms are so devised that once the SEU representation obtains, the
consequences have equally spaced utility values and combine in the EU formula with
only a ﬁnite number of subjective probability values. Moreover, the set of two-
consequence prospects wAz is limited to genuinely uncertain ones, i.e. it excludes
wAw (the certainty of w), which is justiﬁed by another empirical concern. Davidson
and Suppes worry that if sure prospects enter the comparisons, they may introduce the
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distorting inﬂuence of what they call the ‘utility of gambling’.12 Lastly, unlike Ramsey,
Davidson and Suppes restrict their axioms to the indifference part of the preference
ordering on prospects, i.e. in statements of the form wAz ~ yAx, as against those repre-
senting the preference ordering in general, wAz< yAx. In view of all these restrictions,
their representation theorem can only be much weaker than those of Ramsey and (blur-
ring the distinction between risk and uncertainty) VNM, but they fully endorse this
implication: ‘the relative weakness of the present theory is the price to be paid for
making it more behavioristic’ (1956, p. 26).
In Suppes’ mind, an experimental stage had to follow these axiomatic preliminaries,
and it took place in a separate work coauthored with an experimental psychologist
(Davidson, Suppes, & Siegel, 1957). Suppes and his collaborators tried there to identify
an event that would be ‘ethically neutral’ across the pool of subjects. This proved to be
more challenging than expected, because the subjects appeared to express preferences
over the events that a fair coin lands heads rather tails, or that a fair dice rolls to an
odd number rather than an even one. The experimenters adopted a dice with either of
two meaningless syllables, ‘ZEJ’ and ‘ZOJ’, engraved on each of the six sides, and
thus eventually generated what appeared to them to be an ‘ethically neutral’ event A.
From there, they proceeded to elicit utility differences by taking consequences to be
small amounts of money (ranging over cents), both positive and negative. Whenever
possible, utility functions were derived from these data. In principle, an empirical
verdict on SEU theory should have ensued, but the data were in fact inconclusive, as
Suppes came later to recognize.13 When revisiting these experimental efforts, Luce
(1979, p. 102) will also have to conclude that, careful as they were, ‘they did not lead
to a clear decision as to the adequacy of the expected-utility property’.
(ii) Stochastic choice. For good historical reasons, this choice context was not men-
tioned in Suppes and Winet, but once stochastic choice theory took off, Suppes devel-
oped an interest in the utility difference representations this theory delivers, so we have
included it into his revival programme. (See the supporting comment in Suppes &
Zinnes, 1963, p. 38.) Here wx< yz holds in terms of a comparison between the
subject’s choice probabilities. Formally,
wx< yz if and only if pðw; xÞ pðy; zÞ;
where p(w, x) and p(y, z) are the probabilities that the subject chooses w over x and that
he chooses y over z, given the respective menus of options fw; xg; fy; zg  X . Relevant
axiomatizations of < ensure that there exists a utility function u on X such that
pðw; xÞ pðy; zÞ if and only if uðwÞ  uðxÞ uðyÞ  uðzÞ:
Thus, as Luce and Suppes (1965, p. 334) mention, stochastic choice theory in axio-
matic form provides another road to (*). Since the original papers by Davidson and
Marschak (1959) and Block and Marschak (1960), this theory has received at least two
possible interpretations. For both Suppes and Luce, the probabilities are choice frequen-
cies when the choice task is repeated and the source of randomness lies in the choice
itself, as against its psychological determining factors (among which the preferences).
The alternative interpretation locates randomness in these determining factors them-
selves.14
Suppes witnessed the birth of the stochastic choice literature and observed its
development carefully (the review in Luce & Suppes, 1965; Section 5, is still used as a
10 J. Baccelli and P. Mongin
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reference today). He also contributed to it with two novel representation theorems
(Suppes, 1961). They were part of a larger, now little-known project, the originality of
which was that it did not take choice probabilities as given, but derived them in a sup-
posedly rigorous ‘behavioristic’ fashion. The probabilities were the asymptotic result of
a learning process, which consisted of the three stages of stimulus sampling, response
conditioning and reinforcement. This work was also the occasion of sketching a
‘dynamic theory of (…) the acquisition of a particular set of beliefs or values’, which
could override the ‘static’ character of standard representation theorems (1961, p. 186).
(iii) Choice under certainty. This is the other choice context that Suppes and Winet
mention and it is the speciﬁc object of their axiomatic work. They illustrate it by three
concrete variants, each of which represents a step towards experimentation. The ﬁrst
hinges on the subject’s willingness to pay for exchanging options, and it is curiously
reminiscent of the ‘money pump argument’ for the transitivity of preference that
Davidson, McKinsey, and Suppes (1955, p. 146) introduced in the same year. This
takes wx< yz to hold if the subject, when endowed with both x and z, is willing to pay
at least as much to replace x by w as he is to replace z by y.15 A closely related variant
exploits the subject’s willingness to work, with wx< yz holding if the subject, when
endowed with both x and z, is ready to work at least as much to replace x by w as he
is to replace z by y. As Suppes and Winet (1955, p. 260) observe, the common idea
behind these two examples is that a monotonic variation in some agreed on quantity
permits measuring utility differences, thus opening another road to (*). Without the
word and without the historical reference, the third variant leads us back to Paretian
‘transitions’, i.e. wx< yz holds if, when endowed with both x and z, the subject is
either more willing to exchange x for w than z for y, or indifferent between the two
exchanges. By axiomatizing < appropriately, one gets the utility difference representa-
tion (*), with u on X satisfying a relevant uniqueness property. Because Suppes and
Winet derived an absolute difference representation, proper axiomatizations of <
conforming to the third variant needed to await Suppes’ later work, e.g. in Krantz,
Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971, p. 147; see also the restatement in Köbberling,
2006, p. 381).
Each of the suggested variants has its theoretical problems. As Luce and Suppes
(1965, pp. 273–275) will recognize when revisiting them, the ﬁrst two resort to a quan-
tity that does not belong to the initial set of options. One may respond to this by
redeﬁning this set, but then the objection rebounds, since the subject’s preference over
the new options must be separable, and this is a substantial assumption to make.16 That
is, with options now deﬁned as (x, m), where m is, say, a quantity of money, the sub-
ject must rank the m component always in the same way regardless of the value taken
by the x component. This assumption may or may not be appropriate, given the objects
represented by x. Now, the proposed scheme needs < also to be continuous; otherwise
the subject could not determine what money amount m0 makes the option ðy;m0Þ indif-
ferent with (x, m), given two distinct x and y. Continuity is a signiﬁcant assumption to
make when the options are multidimensional.
The Paretian ‘transitions’ variant can eschew the separability and continuity prob-
lems above, but raises other queries. We may discard the objection that to assume that
the subject initially has both x and z violates the principle that options should be alter-
natives, i.e. mutually exclusive objects, for it is enough to redeﬁne them as being pairs
(x, z) and think of the comparisons as being made on such pairs.17 More importantly, it
is not said whether the scheme applies unrestrictedly or only in those cases in which
the subject either prefers w to x or prefers y to z. In the latter interpretation, the subject
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will always compare the status quo with a change for the better, and thus be faced with
a genuine choice problem, but only nonnegative utility differences can be measured in
this way. In the former interpretation, the subject will also compare the status quo with
changes for the worse, and this permits measuring negative utility differences, but the
meaning in terms of choices is not so clear. Indeed, the subject must be forced to
decide between the two evils, and only an experimental context can create the condi-
tions for a forced exchange to take place, whereas choices in the other case could in
principle be observed non-experimentally. All in all, the information carried by such a
decision seems to be less secure than that carried by choices in the other case.
Suppes and Winet (1955, p. 260) illustrate their use of ‘transitions’ by imagining a
housewife faced with a pair of appliances, say a toaster and a waxer, and then
confronted with the ‘choice of trading the toaster for wafﬂe iron, or the waxer for the
blender’. From the corresponding passage, we conclude that Suppes envisaged changes
for the worse as well as for the better.18
Suppes’ writings contains regrettably little on context (iii). The article with Luce
has the following comment: ‘Unfortunately, we know of no experiments that have
attempted to apply either of these methods to the measurement of utility differences’
(1965, p. 274). This in particular indicates that he never set himself the task of experi-
menting with the three concrete variants of (iii). Perhaps he found work along this line
too novel and difﬁcult, perhaps he did not value it so much as he did work on (i) and
(ii), which connected better with his broader theoretical projects.
We now clarify the extent to which Suppes’ contributions conﬂict with ordinalism
and try to decide whether they bring out cogent arguments against it.
4. Suppes and ordinalism
Suppes claimed to be a philosopher and a social scientist, not an economist. As such,
he had no theoretical stake with debasing ordinalism, but he was well aware that his
approach to cardinal utility went against orthodox economic theory. For instance, Luce
and Suppes (1965, p. 273) write: ‘if we speak of the utility difference, or the difference
in preference, between pairs of alternatives, then the classical objection of economists
is that choices between alternatives do not yield behavioral evidence on these differ-
ences’. Suppes also knew the economics literature well enough to recognize dissenters
like Frisch and Lange. The ﬁrst task of this section is to strengthen his allusive com-
ments into an explicit position concerning ordinalism.
Since Suppes promotes the method of representation theorems and thoroughly
applies it to decision theory, all his work takes claim (1) of ordinalism for granted.
Claims (2) and (3), however, are potentially contentious between him and this doctrine.
The statements we have proposed for these claims analytically exclude rejecting (3)
while endorsing (2), so that there are only two ways to contradict ordinalism, i.e. to
reject (2) and (3) or to reject (2) alone. It is not difﬁcult to locate Suppes’ position on
this logical map: he opposes both (2) and (3), thus departing from the economists’
received doctrine more dramatically than Lange and followers do. The last section has
listed three contexts for which he considered axiomatizing ‘utility differences’, and
reviewing them, we ﬁnd that he conceived of the primitive relation wx<yz in terms of
choices for all three contexts, and in terms of preference differences for at least contexts
(i) and (iii). Here is some textual evidence for this conclusion. Suppes performed
choice experiments on (i), and although he did nothing of the kind for (iii), he made
nonetheless clear a choice interpretation for wx<yz also for this context (notice the
12 J. Baccelli and P. Mongin
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word ‘choice’ in the housewife passage of last section). Obviously he had a choice
interpretation for (ii). He made it very clear that he also supported a preference
difference interpretation concerning (i): ‘In the intended interpretation, wx<yz if and
only the difference in preference between w and x is not greater than the difference in
preference between y and z’ (Davidson & Suppes, 1956, p. 262), or concerning both (i)
and (iii): ‘we assume that a prior satisfactory analysis of preference (as opposed to
preference difference) has already been given’ (Suppes & Winet, 1955, p. 260). What
is not so clear is what he thougt of the preference difference interpretation for context
(ii).19 However, the ease with which he moved from the language of choice to that
of preference differences – see, e.g. the quote from Luce and Suppes in the last
paragraph – suggests that he viewed the former, in many circumstances, as providing
good information on the latter. This is sufﬁcient evidence to locate him beyond the
stage where Lange and followers had left the rejection of ordinalism. Although by no
means hostile to introspection, Suppes clearly thought that it was possible, and it would
be more secure, to document preference differences in terms of choices.20
The second, more difﬁcult task of this section is to evaluate the position we thus
attribute to Suppes. We ﬁrst review the three contexts again, focusing on the primitive
relations that enter the representation theorems proved for them by Suppes and related
writers, and we ask two critical questions concerning these relations. Do they receive a
genuine choice interpretation from these contexts? And if a relation receives a genuine
choice interpretation from a context, does it also receive from it a genuine interpretation
in terms of preference differences?
(i) Choice under uncertainty. For deﬁniteness, we focus our discussion on Davidson
and Suppes’ (1956) axiom system. As we have seen, these authors’ primitive is only an
indifference relation, and it is taken to hold only for two-consequence prospects,
wAz ~ yAx, for any event A. Their choice interpretation for such a restricted primitive
raises two questions. First, the more common procedures to reveal an indifference rela-
tion from choices approximate it by supposing that strict preferences exist, and these are
not part of the primitives. We may ignore this problem as if it were purely technical. It
seems indeed possible to start more generally from wAz< yAx and restate Davidson and
Suppes’ axiom system accordingly; this would just liken it to Ramsey’s initial sketch.
Now comes the problem that ‘ethically neutral’ events are elusive to the observer: a sub-
ject might have a well-deﬁned ordering of prospects wAz< yAx, without ever exhibiting
the desired comparison, i.e. x0A  y0Ax0 for some A; x0; y0. If this happens, Ramsey’s
hope of deriving subjective probabilities from choices among prospects collapses
entirely. We may, however, take Davidson, Suppes and Siegel’s word that this existence
problem can be overcome in practice. In sum, with relevant qualiﬁcations, we can agree
that Davidson and Suppes’ axioms are concerned with genuine choices and these adduce
sufﬁcient information for utility differences to be ascertainable from them.
We now attack the remaining question of whether these utility differences represent
preference differences. As Davidson and Suppes preserve the essentials of the equiprob-
ability argument used in the VNM framework, we can at the same time take a position
on their work and this famous piece of decision theory. The trivial equivalence:
1
2
uðwÞ þ 1
2
uðzÞ 1
2
uðyÞ þ 1
2
uðxÞ , uðwÞ  uðxÞ uðyÞ  uðzÞ:
cannot by itself guarantee that the utility differences on the right side have any mean-
ing, let alone the desired meaning of representing preference differences. The meaning
Journal of Economic Methodology 13
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [W
iss
en
sc
ha
fts
ze
ntr
um
 B
erl
in]
 at
 01
:31
 30
 Ju
ne
 20
16
 
criterion for a property of a utility representation lies exclusively in the interpretation
given to the axioms that are used to derive this representation, but neither the VNM
axioms nor the more sophisticated Davidson–Suppes axioms can be interpreted in terms
of preference differences. These axioms can receive a sense in terms of risk attitudes –
e.g. they make these attitudes independent of the lottery or the state of the world
considered – and some meaning can perhaps be found to utility differences by
following this semantic line, but it is clearly distinct from the meaning of interest here.
This straightforward, but powerful argument was made by Luce and Raiffa (1957,
pp. 31–34) when the controversy was raging over VNM utility.21 It can be reﬁned by
adding that, if utility difference could be interpreted in terms of preference differences,
on top of their natural interpretation in terms of risk attitudes, this could only result
from adding axiomatic material. The supplementary axioms can be spelled out in all
technical detail.22 Of course, the next question will be whether such a reinforcement is
purely formal or carries a plausible semantics with it. Whichever the ﬁnal answer, the
fact remains that, in the absence of the supplementary axioms, only the interpretation
in terms of risk attitudes can be considered.
Davidson and Suppes do not even consider this objection. They may be excused on
the ground that they are primarily trying to extract probabilities, and they identify util-
ity values only with this purpose. Utility values that relate only to risk attitudes, not to
preference differences, can ﬁt such a strategy. But it is more difﬁcult to explain Suppes’
inclusion of context (i) along with context (iii) into one and the same research pro-
gramme on utility differences. And elsewhere in his work, he made some deﬁnitely
unguarded claims regarding the ability of u to measure preference differences. For
instance, Davidson et al. (1955, p. 157) bluntly write that axiom systems like the VNM
one ‘suggest relative simple behavioristic procedures for empirically testing degrees of
preference’.
To summarize the case for context (i), this delivers a genuine choice interpretation,
but lacking a suitable defence, no interpretation in terms of preference differences.
(ii) Stochastic choice. There is no question that this context brings out choice infor-
mation, since the primitive term p(w, x) comes with the interpretation of the frequency
of a particular choice. The controversial part is how to relate the stochastic data to pref-
erences. What we have identiﬁed as the major difﬁculty with (i) is still present here:
preference differences do not enter the axiom system, so that the claim that the derived
u value permits representing them is unwarranted. The conclusion just reached for (i)
holds equally well for (ii).
One may strengthen this dismissal by exploiting an intuitive argument that Luce
and Suppes (1965, pp. 334–335) have impartially pointed out. In private correspon-
dence with Luce, Savage had claimed that one could ﬁnd three options x, y and z with
the following properties: the subject wavers between x and y, though slightly in favour
of x, wavers between x and z, though slightly in favour of z, but does not hesitate to
take z when the other option is y. If probabilities could be equated with utility differ-
ences, a contradiction would result. Translating the choice probabilities into utility dif-
ferences, one would get that u(x) − u(y) is a very small positive number, u(x) − u(z) is
another very small positive number and u(z) − u(y) is a quite large positive number.
This is a contradiction since
uðzÞ  uðyÞ ¼ uðzÞ  uðxÞ þ uðxÞ  uðyÞ:
14 J. Baccelli and P. Mongin
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In other words, utility differences must add up, whereas choice probabilities are not
expected always to do so. After a complex discussion, Luce and Suppes acknowledge
that they cannot accommodate the objection entirely (see p. 337).23
One can question the link between stochastic choice and preference differences by
a more direct semantic argument. In general – barring the exceptional 0–1 case –
stochastic choice data do not entail the existence of an ordinal utility function. That a
strongly unique u exists independently of any ordinal representation is paradoxical from
the perspective of utility theory. In fact, stochastic choice theory has been developed
for subjects who either do not have preference orderings, or do have ones, but make
implementations errors and thus deviate from their preferences at the choice level. It
would be very strange to attribute an ordering of preference differences to subjects with
these characteristics.24
To summarize the case for context (ii), the choice interpretation is unproblematic,
but the interpretation in terms of preference differences fails, and this time, we suggest,
for deep semantic reasons, and not simply for lack of a proper justiﬁcation.
(iii) Choice under certainty. We begin by a technical move, i.e. the dismissal of the
absolute difference representation (**) that Suppes and Winet (1955) axiomatically
derive. They need the formidable axiom (labelled A5 in their paper):
xy< yx for all x; y 2 X :
In preference terms, this would entail that the subject is indifferent between moving up
or down the utility scale, which seems absurd. Some empirical measurements ﬁt the
axiom and ensuing representation very well, for instance those involving the distance
concept, and it remains a mystery why Suppes did not mention them in his paper
instead of connecting his axiomatic with a ‘revival’ programme that is ostensibly con-
cerned with preferences. A possible explanation is that he was primarily interested in
this programme, but did not yet have the right theorem for his purpose. As we men-
tioned, axiom systems for (*) appear only in his later work. The crucial axiom in these
systems is:
ðAÞ wx< yz if and only if zy < xw for all x; y; z;w 2 X ;
which is of course much weaker than Suppes and Winet’s A5.
Having thus cleared the ground, we discuss our two questions in terms of compar-
isons of Paretian ‘transitions’. We have left pending the problem that these comparisons
raise when it comes to interpreting them in terms of choices. In one variant, the obser-
ver collects comparisons only when both ‘transitions’ are for the better, and in the
other, he collects them in all cases. Let us consider the more encompassing variant ﬁrst.
When the subject does not spontaneously depart from the status quo, the observer will
have to tell him that he should do so, and force him if necessary. This is a forced
choice all right, but is it less of a choice for that? A purist who would complain that
the choice information is blurred by the intervention would have to take a sceptical
stand on experimental work in decision theory as a whole, since the instructions that
experimenters need to give to their subjects are similarly verbal and authoritarian. They
create artiﬁcial situations that are only remotely related to the subjects’ own experi-
ences, and the answers given for these situations nonetheless count as being representa-
tive of the subjects’ choices. To deny that would be to dismiss basic experiments, such
as Allais’ and Kahneman and Tversky’s, whose signiﬁcance is well established in
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decision theory. We do not see why an experiment on swapping objects, as in the
housewife example, would strike subjects as being stranger than standard experiments
on lotteries, which involve the possibly unfamiliar concept of a numerical probability.
The consistent purist will have to go as far as to claim that only non-induced choices
count, as is supposedly the case with market observations. We interpret Lange’s and
Allen’s claims regarding introspection as reﬂecting this drastic stand, which neoclassical
economist often endorsed both before and after these writers. Here Suppes’ position as
an external observer of economics appears to be a clear advantage.
Another line of argument is available anyhow, which makes it less necessary to dis-
cuss experimentation. For (*) to obtain, axiom (A) must hold, and since it is needed
anyhow, one may use it as well to convert the information on positive differences into
information on negative differences. That is, instead of letting the subject decide
between ‘transitions’ for the worse, one will apply (A) to the more natural comparison
made for the better that results from reversing the order of the ‘transitions’. Notice that
(A) is powerful enough also to cover comparisons between a ‘transition’ for the better
and a ‘transition’ for the worse.25 A philosophical discussion may then ensue to decide
whether (A) makes sense only for a rational agent or as a matter of deﬁnition; this dis-
cussion would be reminiscent of the classic one concerning the transitivity of prefer-
ence, which has been defended in both ways.
We have these two principled ways of defending a choice interpretation for the
primitive relation wx< yz when context (iii) prevails, but we must acknowledge the
complication of motivating the choices in the course of an experiment. Following
the received methodology of experimental economics, if Suppes’ housewife is to
answer truthfully whether she chooses trading the toaster for the wafﬂe iron, or trading
the waxer for the blender, she must be materially motivated to do so. The purist of our
previous discussion may change tack and argue in this more pragmatic way. However,
it is unclear whether the motivation problem is worse here than it is in basic choice
experiments such as Allais’ or Kahneman and Tversky’s, and the purist may have again
to extend his critique farther than he means to.
We now move to the question of whether the relation wx< yz can be interpreted in
terms of preference differences. This is a priori unproblematic, because the axiom sys-
tems are geared at this interpretation, unlike those proposed for contexts (i) and (ii),
but an a posteriori check may be desirable. It would consist in selecting a system from
Suppes’ late work, or even better from a recent catalogue of such systems like the one
Köbberling (2006) offers, and checking that each axiom in turn can receive a plausible
semantics in terms of preference differences. We eschew this task here and just claim
that it can be carried out.
To summarize the case for context (iii), it appears to pass both interpretative tests,
unlike the others.
The rejection of both ordinalist tenets (2) and (3) seems to be warranted at long
last, but we must now explain what kind of utility functions will come out of this rejec-
tion and the simultaneous acceptance of tenet (1). In Section 2, we have clariﬁed the
uniqueness of the VNM utility function u on X by saying that it is only relatively
cardinal. The same restriction holds not only for the utility functions obtained by other
representation theorems for context (i), such as that of Davidson and Suppes, but also
for the utility functions obtained by the very different theorems proved for contexts (ii)
and (iii). Since the last context has emerged as the only one of relevance, we consider
it exclusively from now on.
16 J. Baccelli and P. Mongin
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Like the VNM representation theorem, those proved for (iii) have an existence and
a uniqueness conclusion. According to the former, there exists a utility function u on X
such that
wx< yz if and only if uðwÞ  uðxÞ uðyÞ  uðzÞ;
and according to the latter, u is unique to PAT in this utility difference representation.
This speciﬁc relative uniqueness conclusion actually depends on having included rele-
vant solvability assumptions into the axioms – Suppes’ way – or making sufﬁciently
strong domain assumptions – the more standard contemporary way – but we may gloss
over this technicality, and just concentrate on the fact that the format restriction is
inevitable, exactly as it was in the VNM case.26
The previous equivalence can be transformed into
wx< yz if and only if uðuðwÞ  uðxÞÞuðuðyÞ  uðzÞÞ;
where φ is any increasing transform of u, and this states exactly what the generic form
of the representation of the quaternary relation is. We can illustrate the consequences
for the uniqueness of u by taking u ¼ exp, so that
wx< yz if and only if exp ðuðwÞ  uðxÞÞ expðuðyÞ  uðzÞÞ:
If we deﬁne u0 ¼ expu, this equivalence becomes
wx< yz if and only if u
0ðwÞ
u0ðxÞ 
u0ðyÞ
u0ðzÞ ;
and we have checked that, by deviating from the utility difference format, one can ﬁnd
a utility function u0 on X that is not a PAT of u, but can nonethless serve to represent
the primitive relation. In brief, even with a direct axiomatization of preference differ-
ences, the resulting utility function on X can only be relatively cardinal.
Does this fact diminish our conclusion that a utility function can combine the three
attributes of being purely representational, representing preference differences and hav-
ing a choice basis? We do not think so. There is no analytic connection between the
property of representing preference differences and of being cardinal absolutely rather
than relatively, so that we can take the fact in question as making the conclusion more
precise instead of contradicting it. It is true that from the point of view of measurement
theory, an absolutely cardinal utility function would be a more satisfactory result. If it
could be obtained by representation theorems in decision theory, some measurements in
this ﬁeld would enjoy the respectable status of temperature measurement. There are
occasional vacillations in Suppes’ and Luce’s statements of the uniqueness of utility
functions, and they suggest that they might have been misled by such physical analo-
gies.27 With the beneﬁt of hindsight, one may doubt that decision theory will ever
reach this higher measurement stage, and the hope seems also forlorn in the related
ﬁeld of psychophysics. For instance, Falmagne’s (Falmagne, 2002) book on psy-
chophysics directly deﬁnes a utility difference representation in terms of the generic
form φ(u(w) − u(x)).
Journal of Economic Methodology 17
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [W
iss
en
sc
ha
fts
ze
ntr
um
 B
erl
in]
 at
 01
:31
 30
 Ju
ne
 20
16
 
5. Conclusion
On the occasion of an homage to Patrick Suppes, we have revisited some classic con-
troversies of theoretical economics on ordinal and cardinal utility functions. No doubt a
full investigation of this contrast should involve one in considering not only Suppes
and his group of collaborators, but also Allais (1994) and Harsanyi (1955), who devel-
oped different brands of ideas about cardinal utility, and writers in the classical and
early neoclassical tradition, who did not think of utility functions as being obtained by
representation theorems. Despite these lacunas, we hope to have brought some concep-
tual clarity to a still poorly understood debate. By identifying three distinctive claims in
ordinalism, which is not usually done, we have been able to contrast Suppes’ choice-
based cardinalism from Lange’s introspection-based form of this doctrine, and by care-
fully attending to the theoretical and empirical differences between the choice contexts
in which Suppes’ cardinalism could possibly be implemented, we have ﬁnally been
able to retain one of his suggestions.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to the editors of the Journal of Economic Methodology for inviting this
paper, and the second author thanks them for allowing him to pay a personal tribute to Patrick
Suppes’ leadership and inspiration. The paper was completed when this author was visiting
Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin. The authors have greatly beneﬁted from a continuous dialogue
with Ivan Moscati, as well from Mikaël Cozic’s insightful comments.
Notes
1. To our knowledge, the present paper and Moscati’s (2016b) are the ﬁrst to discuss Suppes’
utility theory in any detail. Previous homages have emphasized his measurement theory and
probability theory, and thus touched on our topic only indirectly (Luce, 1979; Rosenkrantz,
1979).
2. Mongin (2003) has questioned this identiﬁcation of the axiomatic method with representa-
tion theorems. We will however take it for granted here.
3. See Moscati’s (2013a, 2013b, 2016a) thorough account of how the cardinal versus ordinal
distinction stabilized in economics and decision theory.
4. The Foundations uses ‘ordinal utility’ and ‘ordinal preference’ interchangeably, and the
index of the book refers to both expressions in a single entry (labelled after the latter).
5. On a different score, we do not need to extend our notion of ‘ordinalism’ to the collective
form prevailing in social choice theory and social ethics. The word has been used there
quite extensively, still assuming (2) without saying, to deny that interpersonal comparisons
of utility are possible (see, e.g. Arrow, 1973, p. 253).
6. On the distinction between a formalization and an axiomatization, see Mongin (2003).
Chipman (1971, pp. 327–329) conﬁrms Alt’s precedence in axiomatizing cardinal utility
(without the word ‘cardinal’) for the ﬁrst time. Moscati (2013a) examines how ideas of
comparing ‘transitions’ spread out among economists.
7. A positive afﬁne transformation is of the form f(x) = ax + b, with a > 0.
8. Whether or not this position conﬂicts with behaviourism becomes a terminological issue. In
his self-retrospective, Suppes claims to adhere to a form of ‘methodological behaviorism
(…) wholly compatible with mentalistic concepts’ (Suppes, 1979, p. 34).
9. This quote is from Davidson and Suppes (1956, p. 159). A similar passage can be found in
Suppes and Winet (1955, p. 259).
10. See also Bradley’s (2004) reconstruction of Ramsey in fully contemporary style.
11. By a curious contrast, Suppes (1956) deﬁnes the quaternary relation < on a set even larger
than Ramsey’s, i.e. the set of probability mixtures of prospects. As Suppes is well aware of,
this contravenes to his principle of taking small domains for <
18 J. Baccelli and P. Mongin
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12. The utility of gambling (which Suppes understands somewhat differently from VNM) is the
topic of Royden, Suppes and Walsh (1959).
13. One problem was that the experimental model allowed for an ‘error’ in the subject’s
responses, and this turned out also to permit violations of the SEU axioms. Suppes and
Walsh (1959) tried to circumvent the problem, but their results were not clear-cut either.
14. For surveys that emphasize this duality, see de Palma and Thisse (1987) and Fishburn
(1998).
15. Rosenkrantz (1979, p. 117) interestingly connects this variant with the idea of ‘dollar vote’
in social choice theory.
16. Fishburn (1970, Chapter 6) restates the problem in this more sophisticated way.
17. This objection appears in Fishburn (1970, Chapter 6).
18. We conclude this from the expression ‘due account being taken of the algebraic sign of the
difference’ (Suppes & Winet, 1955, p. 260). This expression recurs in Luce and Suppes
(1965, p. 274).
19. See Luce and Suppes’ (1965, p. 334) convoluted comment on two forms of ‘strength of
preference’ in context (ii). This is part of a passage where they present a counterexample
by Savage, which we are going to discuss.
20. When commenting on Lange, Alt (1936, in 1971, p. 425) and Zeuthen (1937, p. 237) had
passingly contemplated the possibility of collecting choice evidence on preference differ-
ences.
21. Allen (1956, pp. 674–675) makes the same point using numerical examples.
22. See Bouyssou and Vansnick’s (1990) clear summary.
23. Savage takes x to be a pony, y to be an ordinary bicycle and z to be a sophisticated bicycle.
The subject, a boy, cannot make his mind between x and y, or between x and z, but does
not hesitate anymore when comparing z and y.
24. We have followed Luce’s and Suppes’ usual view of choice probabilities. In the alternative
conception, randomness takes place prior to the choice level, and is often understood as
having to do with what ordering the subject will implement in his choices. It is no more
plausible in this conception that utility differences capture preference differences.
25. From (A), if wx< yy, then yy< xw, whence wx< xw by transitivity.
26. See Basu (1982) for the standard contemporary way of reaching the relative uniqueness
restriction. Note that a domain restriction is also embodied in VNM theory, as it postulates
a set of lotteries, which are highly structured objects.
27. A somewhat gross example appears in the following passage: ‘the various systems devel-
oped to represent the expected utility hypothesis end up with the result that utility is mea-
sured on an interval scale’ (Luce & Suppes, 1965, p. 284). A utility function deﬁned on an
interval scale is absolutely cardinal. This is however a rare example; compare with the
entirely correct formulation in Davidson and Suppes (1956).
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